

ARMY SAFETY & ENVIRONMENT MATTERS

73 Autumn 2026

Learning in Motion

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
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'Protecting the Force'
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
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
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WELCOME

This has been a tough last few months with the deaths of Capt Muldowney RA, LBdr Sullivan KTRHA, and LCpl Freeman 1 R Ang in Army Command, and then the loss of the Commando Merlin helicopter and deaths of Lieutenant Commander Gayson, Lieutenant Fisher and Petty Officer Green.

And the Army is due to receive the next Crown Censure in November this year. All tragic reminders that our business is inherently dangerous.

The Defence Safety Authority annual reports for 2025/26 stated that the Army is operating a Safety Management System under sustained pressure from organisational change, workforce constraints, and increasing modernisation and operational demands. Reduced assurance outcomes were recorded across the regulated areas and these weaknesses are compounded by workforce pressures, gaps in suitably qualified and experience personnel (both currency and competence), and inconsistent first-line risk assessment and assurance. Some safety-critical governance is becoming overly checklist-driven rather than actively managed, demonstrating gaps between policy intent and delivery.

Therefore, even though this edition of Safety Matters has a military driving theme with excellent articles from WO1 Staff Master Driver Brunetti, and Vanessa Jones and Gary Lewry from the Organisational Learning Team, I am taking this opportunity to urge us all, in these times of pressure and growing demands, to adhere to the safety basics no matter what the activity – identifying hazards, the controls to treat them and who is responsible for implementing those controls – all to deliver a safe system of work. Only when that process is done properly will risk be properly understood.

The Front Line is where safety is planned and executed, which, when done well allows the Army to train more demanding scenarios with more modern equipment. This is about competence, which drives a safer system, which in turn results in better competence – a virtuous circle.

So, in that spirit I commend to you Tony Richards' article from 1XX (page 18), particularly the comments about understanding risk and using it intelligently on Ex STEADFAST DART 25. And then Nic Anderon's piece on evolving proportional safety cases (page 22) is also very important in an era of more rapid acquisition with novel technology. Critical are the fundamentals of evidence to back up a safety case and matching the safe operating envelope to the safety evidence. As the evidence improves so the operating envelope can expand.

Brigadier Giles Malec
Head of Safety (Army)
Army Safety Group



NEWS IN BRIEF

Army Safety Group (ASG) continues to drive a sharper, more disciplined approach to safety delivery – focusing on accountability, policy reform, and a more credible assurance model across the Army to ensure the right focus at the front line.

People and Appointments

Recent postings are strengthening the team at a critical time. The anticipated arrival of the new Deputy Head of ASG Capability Safety Team brings additional senior oversight to drive pace and coherence across capability safety activity, particularly in ensuring an effective capability safety management system through Army Reform changes, assurance, and supporting rapid acquisition delivery.

ASG also would like to congratulate Sophia Hearne on her promotion to SEO Policy within the Safety Centre, where she will be reinforcing capacity to develop and deliver the next generation of Army safety policy. This comes at a pivotal moment as policy, assurance, and governance frameworks undergo significant reform.

Driving Accountability and Delivery

The focus remains firmly on outcomes. ASG activity has continued to tighten grip on organisational learning and recommendation delivery, ensuring clearer ownership and improved pace across recommendation owners and implementation managers to result in demonstrable risk reduction, not administrative closure.

Engagement across Front Line Commands is reinforcing accountability at the right level, with commanders expected to understand the risks they hold and actively manage them.

MySafety remains pivotal in the reporting of accidents, incidents and near misses. ASG has recognised the importance of quality data and are working with our contracted partners, WSP, to develop a training package to support units.

The Army Safety Investigation Team (ASIT) continue to deploy to those incidents that don't meet the DAIB thresholds. The last few months have seen them investigate Land Rover rollovers and two incidents involving Warrior.

CESO(A) Direction: Duty of Care v Duty Holding

CESO (A), Martin Buckley, has, throughout his first year in post, set a clear and consistent direction, prioritising Duty of Care (DoC) and the disciplined application of Duty Holding strictly in accordance with ACSO 1200, recognising its use only in extremis. He has driven a rigorous approach to testing the effectiveness of Duty Holding arrangements, challenging where responsibility is unclear, misapplied, or diluted. In parallel, he has reinforced that the legal Duty of Care is fundamental to how the Army operates, it's not optional catalysing. A shift away from compliance-led activity towards a leadership driven model is a fundamental part of safety risk management and the ownership of risk, as are ensuring decisions and their

consequences are understood and held at the appropriate level.

Policy Reform: ACSO 1200 and Army Framework Review, ACSO 1201

Work continues at pace on revising ACSO 1200, with publication planned for Sept 26, delivering clear and coherent direction that simplifies the current landscape and enables commanders to act decisively. In parallel, ASG is reviewing the SHEF framework and AF5010 to ensure they remain relevant, proportionate, and aligned with Defence policy, with a focus on reducing duplication, sharpening requirements, and ensuring policy drives insight and action rather than process for its own sake. ACSO 1201 (Safety in the acquisition process) also remains at mature draft waiting for Army Reform structures to settle.

ASEMSA Audit and Assurance

The Army Safety and Environmental Management System Assurance (ASEMSA) audit and inspection regime is being reshaped to align with JSP 815, signalling a clear shift towards a more risk-based, outcome-focused model. Future assurance activity will prioritise testing effectiveness on the ground, assessing whether controls are functioning and risks reduced, rather than simply measuring compliance. This approach will provide commanders with a more realistic understanding of their risk position and strengthen confidence in the overall system. In Jan 27 we will see the removal of the unit self-assessment which will be replaced by the mandating of all units to use the Army SHEF Framework which will provide the legal compliance against the legislation and reduce the

burden on unit personnel to deliver the 1LoDA, The ASEMSA 2LoDA audit and assurance will return to a 3 yearly cycle from 2027.

Challenges: RAPSTONE, DIP Delay and Capacity Pressure

ASG continues to face delivery challenge. RAPSTONE remains under pressure, with a growing portfolio supported by the Defence Investment Plan (DIP). This is creating prioritisation challenges across the system and slowing delivery against planned capability enhancements, with a direct impact on the timeliness and effectiveness of safety evidence.

At the same time, Army safety capacity remains stretched and carries risk. Gaps in specialist roles and wider unit resource are limiting assurance activity, slowing the delivery of recommendations, and putting consistency of standards under strain. These pressures are recognised and remain the focus of senior attention.

Looking Ahead

ASG's direction is clear:

- Strengthen accountability and ownership of risk.
- Deliver simplified, usable policy through ACSO 1200 policies, including publishing of ACSO 1201.
- Reform assurance to focus on real-world effectiveness.
- Stabilise capability and address system dependencies with the aim being that the Army has a management system which is credible, proportionate, and delivers where it matters – protecting our people while enabling the Army to deliver operational outputs effectively.



SOLAR: TURNING INSIGHT INTO ACTION ACROSS THE ARMY

Contributed by Vanessa Jones, AH Safety Organisational Learning, Army Safety Group

Since the spring edition of Army Safety & Environment Matters, the Safety Organisational Learning and Army Reporting (SOLAR) team has continued to strengthen our role at the heart of Army safety management. Its focus remains clear: improving reporting, sharpening organisational learning, and ensuring that lessons identified are translated into meaningful, lasting action.

A key area of progress has been the continued emphasis on improving the quality and utility of safety reporting through MySafety. Working with units and formation headquarters, SOLAR has reinforced the importance of timely, accurate and learning-focused submissions. This effort is helping to build a stronger evidence base across the Army, enabling better understanding of where risks exist and how they can be prevented from recurring.



However, the team and I are clear-eyed about the challenge ahead. While reporting standards are improving, inconsistencies in quality and completeness still limit the full value of safety data. SOLAR is therefore driving cultural change, emphasising that strong reporting discipline at unit level is essential if data is to generate actionable insight. This shift marks a move away from a system driven by compliance alone, towards one powered by analysis, insight, and prevention.

Alongside improvements in reporting, SOLAR has made significant strides in recommendation management. Strengthening the embedding of the Defence Accident Investigation Branch (DAIB) Recommendation Implementation Tool (RIT) processes has enabled clearer tracking, ownership, and assurance of recommendations. Ensuring that each recommendation has both a defined owner and an implementation manager has been central to this progress, recognising that accountability is fundamental to effective organisational learning.

Importantly, greater emphasis is now being placed on differentiating between DAIB-closed and Army-delegated closures. This distinction is improving transparency and auditability, while providing stronger assurance that recommendations are not only completed but deliver sustained

risk reduction. SOLAR has also increased oversight of recommendation delivery, ensuring that learning is embedded across the Army rather than remaining within investigation reports.

Recent Service Inquiries and DAIB investigations continue to reinforce three critical themes for the Army. First, management assurance must be active and robust. Organisations cannot assume controls are effective simply because they exist; they must be continually tested and validated. Second, operational risk must be actively managed. Known hazards can become normalised over time, requiring constant vigilance to ensure controls remain effective. Third, learning is only complete when action is delivered. Identifying lessons is not enough – implementation, monitoring, and sustained change are what ultimately prevent recurrence.

Beyond processes and systems, SOLAR has maintained strong engagement across the safety community. Through workshops, briefings and direct support, the team is building greater understanding of reporting requirements and reinforcing the importance of knowledge-sharing. This engagement is critical to embedding a proactive safety culture and ensuring that lessons identified are translated into changes in policy, training and behaviour.



This work is set against a backdrop of significant milestones, including forthcoming Crown Censure proceedings and the publication of several Service Inquiries. These events are not only important for Defence and the Army, but also for the families affected. SOLAR continues to support coordination and engagement, ensuring that the Army's commitment to learning from tragedy remains clear and credible.

Looking ahead, SOLAR's ambition is unchanged: to provide commanders with sharper insight, strengthen decision-making, and ensure that organisational learning drives tangible improvements in safety outcomes. Through better data, clearer accountability, and a relentless focus on implementation, SOLAR is helping the Army turn lessons into action – and action into lasting change.



ASIT UPDATE

Contributed by Adam Dunmore,
ASIT 2IC, Army Safety Group

The Army Safety Investigation Team (ASIT) continues to make steady progress towards full establishment and operational maturity.

The team is currently one investigator short of its full complement, with five investigators now fully trained, competent, and qualified to Postgraduate Certificate (PG Cert) level. Achieving Full Operating Capability (FOC) will require the recruitment and training of one additional investigator, alongside further development training for four existing team members. The team anticipates filling the final post by the end of 2026.

Investigating Incidents

All incidents should be investigated, and any incident resulting in injury must be subject to a formal investigation. The primary aim is to understand why the incident occurred; only once the root cause is clearly identified can effective measures be implemented to prevent recurrence.

Within the Army TLB, investigations are often time-bound. While this ensures timely reporting, such constraints can, at times, limit the depth of analysis and affect the robustness of findings and subsequent preventative actions. It is therefore essential that safety investigations are conducted by current, competent, and appropriately qualified personnel.

Depending on the nature and severity of the incident, this may involve a Force Protection Investigator at Level 1, ASIT at Level 2, or the Defence Accident Investigation Branch (DAIB) at Level 3. In certain circumstances, external bodies such as the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) may also be required to investigate. Ensuring that the right level of expertise is applied is critical to producing an accurate account of events and delivering meaningful recommendations to improve safety and prevent future occurrences.

Closing Recommendations

ASIT now track recommendations to closure. When ASIT reports are released, the Recommendation Owner (RO) will be required to nominate an Implementation Manager (IM), who implements any changes required to ensure a safer activity. The IM will then work with the ASIT Lead Investigator who made the recommendation to collate the necessary evidence of implementation.

Lessons Identified

In 2026, ASIT has conducted nine Level 2 investigations, generating a total of 26 recommendations. As these recommendations are implemented and closed, they are expected to make a positive impact on the safety of personnel. A further three investigations remain ongoing, each likely to produce additional recommendations that will further strengthen safety practices.

Incident Trends

Seven of the nine completed investigations in 2026 relate to military driving. This reflects a continuing pattern observed in 2025, where 21 of 36 investigations conducted involved a vehicle. This recurring theme highlights the need for sustained focus on driving standards, training, and risk management across the Army.



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MySafety

MYSAFETY UPDATE

Contributed by Jason Carnihan,
Data & Digital AHd, MySafety
Product Owner, Directorate
of Defence Safety

A major set of enhancements to MySafety is transforming the way occurrence reporting is managed across the organisation – making the process clearer, more transparent and more responsive for users.

The improvements are designed to do more than simply modernise the system. They aim to strengthen confidence in safety reporting by ensuring every report is acknowledged, reviewed and acted upon appropriately, while making it easier for personnel to see how reporting contributes directly to safer outcomes and organisational learning.

A Clearer Journey from Report to Resolution

One of the biggest changes users will notice is the introduction of a much clearer reporting workflow.

Previously, users often had limited visibility of what happened after they submitted a report. The upgraded system now provides defined statuses that show exactly where a report sits within the process – from submission through to closure.

Occurrence reports submitted through MODNET will initially appear as **'OR Submitted – Awaiting Review'**. While Defence Gateway submissions will show: **'Occurrence Notification Submitted – Awaiting Completion'**.

Once reviewed by the designated Occurrence Manager (OM), reports move to **'Open Report'**. At this stage, the OM determines what level of review or investigation is needed. Importantly, not every occurrence requires a lengthy formal investigation – but every report will receive a proportionate review.

Depending on the nature and severity of the issue, reports may progress through **'Awaiting Investigation'** to **'Under Investigation'** before eventually being **'Closed and Filed'**. The result is a more transparent and professionally managed process that gives users confidence their concerns are being taken seriously.

Better Feedback for Reporters

One of the most welcome changes is improved communication with the people who submit reports.

A common frustration in many reporting systems is the feeling that information disappears into a "black hole" after submission. The enhanced MySafety system directly tackles this issue through automated notifications. Users will now receive confirmation when their report has been accepted onto the system; and when the report has been formally closed. This simple change provides reassurance that reports are being actively managed and helps reinforce the value of speaking up.

The organisation hopes that increased visibility and feedback will encourage

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more personnel to report hazards, concerns and near misses – helping identify risks earlier and improving safety outcomes for everyone.

Stronger Oversight and Accountability

The upgrades also introduce clearer investigation tracking to improve accountability and governance.

Investigations will now move through **'Awaiting Acceptance'** to **'In Progress'** to **'Complete'**. These improvements give managers and investigators a clearer picture of investigative activity while helping ensure investigations progress more effectively.

Exciting New Features Coming Soon

The latest enhancements are only the beginning, with several important new capabilities planned for rollout over the coming months.

Offline Reporting Capability

Personnel operating in deployed environments or locations with limited connectivity will be able to complete a spreadsheet-based occurrence report offline and upload it once network access becomes available. This means reporting can continue uninterrupted – even when MODNET access is unavailable.

Open Reporting System

A new open reporting system will also increase organisational learning by allowing users to view:

- approved occurrence reports;
- completed investigations; and
- recommendations.

This will help personnel better understand how issues are resolved while encouraging wider sharing of lessons identified across the organisation.

Anonymous Reporting

Another significant enhancement is the planned introduction of anonymous reporting capability. By allowing personnel to raise concerns without identifying themselves, the organisation aims to reduce barriers to reporting and encourage greater openness around hazards, risks and near misses.

The expectation is that this will:

- improve hazard identification;
- increase reporting levels; and
- strengthen organisational learning.

Faster Action through 'My Reports'

New My Reports functionality will help OM's quickly identify actions requiring attention, helping:

- improve workflow management;
- reduce delays; and
- support faster progression of investigations.

A Stronger Reporting Culture

Collectively, the MySafety enhancements represent a significant step forward in modernising occurrence management and supporting a more positive reporting culture.

By improving transparency, communication and accessibility, the organisation is sending a clear message: reporting matters, every concern is valued, and learning from incidents is essential to improving safety for everyone.




LESSONS FROM SENNYBRIDGE: WHY A ROUTINE DRIVE BECAME AN AVOIDABLE TRAGEDY

Contributed by Gary Lewry,
SOLAR SEO, Army Safety Group


A routine refuelling task on a familiar training area route ended in the loss of Pte Adam Brocklehurst. The Service Inquiry into the accident at Church Hill, near Sennybridge, is a stark reminder that everyday military driving can become high-risk when speed, terrain, supervision, training and personal discipline are not aligned.

Introduction

On 20 September 2023, Pte Brocklehurst, an RLC driver from 400 Troop, ITC Catterick, was driving a MAN Support Vehicle to refuel before his company's return from Sennybridge Training Area. What followed was not the result of a single catastrophic failure, but a combination of factors that reduced the margin for error until recovery was no longer possible.



Intended vehicle route from Dixie's Corner to Sennybridge Camp:
The short refuelling journey from Dixie's Corner to Sennybridge Camp required the MAN SVs to descend Church Hill, a demanding access route with steep gradients and narrow carriageways.



Overview of accident imagery locations / overhead view of Church Hill:

The accident sequence developed within seconds – an initial excursion onto the left verge, a rapid movement towards the central embankment, and an unrecoverable loss of control on a road with little margin for error.

At a Glance: The Service Inquiry identified inappropriate speed for the road conditions as the causal factor, with driver hazard perception and the Church Hill access route as contributory factors. Not wearing a seatbelt was assessed as an aggravating factor. The wider recommendations point to a need for stronger speed discipline, better hazard perception training, improved supervision, clearer governance, better use of driving data and more effective learning from previous accidents.

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A Familiar Route with Little Room for Error


Pte Brocklehurst and another MAN SV departed Dixie's Corner on SENTA to conduct a standard refuel at Sennybridge Camp. Their route required descending Church Hill: a narrow public road with steep gradients, soft verges and no protective barriers. Although legally subject to the national speed limit, the road's layout and condition made it a demanding environment for heavy military vehicles.

Near the final third of the descent, the vehicle's wheels left the metalled surface on the left-hand verge. A corrective input, or possible braking on uneven ground, caused the vehicle to veer right and

strike the central embankment. It travelled through trees and bushes, rode up the embankment, became briefly airborne and landed hard on the northbound carriageway.

Pte Brocklehurst was not wearing a seatbelt. During the accident sequence he was thrown into the cab roof area, suffered fatal head injuries and was subsequently ejected when the driver's door opened. The vehicle then continued uncrewed for approximately 300 metres before coming to rest in a maize field after severed airlines applied the brakes.

The central lesson is simple but uncomfortable: routine tasks can carry exceptional risk when the environment leaves no margin for error.



What the Inquiry Found

Lesson 1: Safe speed is not the same as legal speed

The vehicle was not exceeding the legal speed limit, but modelling indicated a descent speed of around 33–35 mph. Master Driver subject matter experts assessed that 20 mph was the maximum safe speed for that route. On a steep, narrow and wet road with soft verges, the difference between "legal" and "safe" was decisive.

Takeaway: Commanders and drivers must set speeds according to conditions, vehicle type and road geometry – not simply the posted limit.


Lesson 2: Seatbelts are a final line of defence

The seatbelt was serviceable, but was not being worn. The Inquiry judged it very likely that a correctly worn seatbelt would have prevented ejection and could have changed the outcome. It also noted the absence of a seatbelt warning system in the MAN SV and observed wider non-compliance among service drivers during the investigation period.

Takeaway: Seatbelt compliance cannot be assumed. It must be briefed, supervised, enforced and normalised as a professional driving standard.

Dented air ducting above the driver's seat:

Evidence inside the cab showed the consequences of being unrestrained during the accident sequence. The Inquiry judged it very likely that a correctly worn seatbelt would have prevented or reduced the impact injuries and ejection.




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Lesson 3: Hazard perception must be trained for real-world roads

The Inquiry found that the Defence HGV driver training pipeline did not sufficiently develop defensive driving or hazard perception for steep, narrow civilian roads. The issue was not simply individual error: many MAN SVs had historically descended Church Hill at unsafe speeds, indicating a wider pattern of risk being underestimated.

Takeaway: Driver competence must include judgement under realistic conditions: gradient, road width, weather, load, traffic and recovery options.



Width of MAN SV on Church Hill Road:

At the accident site, the metalled road surface was only marginally wider than the MAN SV, leaving little tolerance for a heavy vehicle on wet verges and a steep descent.

Lesson 4: Infrastructure risk must be owned, not tolerated

Church Hill may have been the least-bad access option, but its steep gradient, narrow lanes, limited verges and lack of barriers presented an inherent risk to military HGV movements. Where infrastructure cannot be immediately changed, the risk must be actively controlled through route selection, speed restrictions, supervision and clear briefings.

Lesson 5: Distraction controls must match real behaviour

There was no evidence of mobile phone use, but music was playing in the cab and other personal items were accessible. The Inquiry could not determine whether distraction contributed, but it did identify a gap between policy and observed behaviour. In high-risk driving environments, even minor distractions can erode the driver's remaining margin.

Lessons for Commanders, Supervisors and Drivers

For commanders: set the conditions for safe movement

- Identify hazardous access routes and set clear, vehicle-specific speed expectations before movement.
- Ensure safety briefings reach all drivers, including personnel completing routine support tasks.
- Use supervision, route discipline and policing to reinforce standards where the consequences of error are severe.

For supervisors: check the basics every time

- Confirm seatbelt use, route understanding, convoy arrangements and speed restrictions before departure.
- Challenge normalised deviation, especially where drivers have repeatedly completed the same route without incident.
- Capture and maintain continuation training, not just initial driving qualifications.

For drivers: professional judgement starts before the hill

- Wear the seatbelt, every time, regardless of distance, familiarity or perceived risk.
- Drive to the conditions, not the legal limit; steep, narrow and wet roads demand early speed reduction.
- Remove avoidable distractions and focus fully on vehicle control during high-risk sections of any route.

The key message

The lesson is not that military driving is inherently unsafe; it is that familiar tasks must still be planned, briefed and executed with discipline when the operating environment is unforgiving. Give yourself time to plan and make sure you understand what is required.

Turning Inquiry into Action

Pte Adam Brocklehurst was a trusted, competent and experienced driver conducting a routine task in support of training. His death followed a momentary loss of control in an unforgiving environment, compounded by recognised hazards and systemic weaknesses. Reflect on how often you have approached the limits of safe operating parameters highlighted in this case. Consider how your experiences can help others learn, how you can better protect yourself and your fellow soldiers, and what additional actions you could take to reduce risk.

The Service Inquiry's message is unequivocal: this was an avoidable tragedy. The challenge now is to turn lessons into lasting change through stronger speed discipline, unwavering seatbelt compliance, enhanced hazard perception, robust route risk management, and a culture that recognises military driving as a safety-critical activity. Safe outcomes depend on all of us.



THREE SECONDS THAT DECIDE WHO COMES HOME

Contributed by Vanessa Jones, AH Safety Organisational Learning, Army Safety Group

The British Army's Foxhound, Jackal and other military platforms were built for war and not for comfort. Fast, aggressive, high-mobility platforms designed to survive rough terrain, IED strikes and hostile environments. But across multiple British Army Service Inquiries, one brutal truth keeps appearing again and again: vehicles don't kill soldiers as often as being thrown around inside them does.

The myth still exists in some circles that wearing a harness slows soldiers down. That somehow staying "loose" inside a vehicle makes you more tactical, more ready, more switched on. Service Inquiry findings repeatedly show the opposite. When Jackals and other military vehicles roll, they do it violently and without warning. There is no time to brace. No time to jump clear. No heroic recovery move. Just impact, weight and chaos.

The Ministry of Defence's published inquiry into the fatal 2019 Jackal rollover at Catterick highlighted how quickly control can be lost and how devastating rollover incidents become. This is just one tragic example of what happens when things go devastatingly wrong.

The wider MOD archive of Service Inquiry reports, paints the same picture across Defence: preventable deaths often involve failures in restraint use, safety discipline or risk management.

This is not paperwork for staff officers. It is blood-written learning.

In military vehicle accidents, unrestrained occupants become projectiles. A fully equipped soldier weighs well over 100 kilos once weapons, body armour, ammunition and kit are included. In a rollover, that weight becomes lethal force. Soldiers are smashed into roll cages, crushed by mounted equipment or ejected entirely. Survivable incidents become fatal in seconds.

Seatbelts and harness systems are not there because the Army has become soft. They are there because investigations proved soldiers were dying without them.

And yet the old excuses survive:

- "I need to get out quickly."
- "You can't fight strapped in."
- "It won't happen to us."

Wrong!

If you are unconscious, you are not dismounting. If you are pinned under a vehicle, you are not returning fire. If your crew commander is thrown from the wagon during a rollover, the fight is already lost.

Modern British Army platforms like Jackal and Foxhound were engineered with survivability in mind. Roll cages, blast protection and restraint systems only work together when soldiers actually use them. Ignore one part of that system and the entire protection concept collapses.

The Army does not investigate fatal accidents for curiosity. Service Inquiries exist to stop the same mistakes killing more people.

The lesson is brutally simple – discipline saves lives.

- Not luck.
- Not bravado.
- Not "battle instincts".

Three seconds to clip in can decide whether a soldier walks away, gets stretchered out, or never goes home at all.

Foxhound and Jackal do not forgive complacency Neither does gravity.

- Wear the belt.
- Tighten the harness.
- Stay in the fight.

Further awareness materials are available via the [Army Safety Group Defence Connect page](#).

Personnel are strongly encouraged to view and share these resources to reinforce safe behaviours and embed lessons identified across the Army.

Video Short

Army Use of Seatbelts, Lap Belts and Harnesses
<https://jive.defencegateway.mod.uk/videos/52118>



AJAX NOISE AND VIBRATION ASIT INVESTIGATION

Contributed by Maj Dave Ford, OC,
Army Safety Investigation Team (ASIT), ASG

In Nov 25 EX TITAN STORM (EX TS) was stopped due to multiple service personnel reporting conditions that were systematic with noise and vibration exposure while operating on Ajax platforms. The Army Safety Investigation Team (ASIT) was instructed to investigate the potential causal factors in order to prevent further incidents.

With 33 people reporting symptoms over 23 vehicles, it was clear the size of the investigation would be a defining moment in the growth of ASIT, which had only been at full operating capacity for three months. It should be noted that although the team had investigated single life changing injuries within occurrences, this investigation, although no one was severely injured, would be lengthy, attract significant outside interest and could help define the future of the light cavalry programme. That said, there was never any pressure applied, either direct or perceived to pass judgement on the viability of the platform, the investigation remained focused on 'Why' the symptoms materialised.

THE INVESTIGATION

ASIT deployed four investigators and were supported throughout by Army SMEs, NAD (DE&S), the Armoured Cavalry Programme and General Dynamics Land Systems UK (GDLSUK). The investigation remained flexible within a planned framework to explore a series of hypotheses as to the causes of the symptoms.



Loose track tension

Physical Evidence

Using an agreed 45-point inspection process the condition of the 23 impacted vehicles was recorded. The aim of which was to determine any significant vehicle related defects that could be linked to symptoms. To benchmark these inspections, four non-impacted vehicles were also inspected.

The results of the inspections highlighted issues that were only present on the 23 impacted vehicles. Incorrect track tension; loose deck bolts; Bowman equipment configuration and condition; reliability of auxiliary power units; reliability, configuration and use of the collective protection and environmental control systems; as well as security of internal and external components – were all identified as potential contributing factors to the symptoms presented.

Continued...





Testing for Noise and Vibration (N&V)

The 23 impacted vehicles were tested for N&V over three months, using set test conditions. During testing the vehicle conditions found during the 45-point inspection were not corrected, unless it created a risk to the people conducting the tests. Tests were conducted by GDLSUK, witnessed by ASIT. Collectively the vehicles travelled over 640km during this period

- **Return Run Testing** – Five of the 23 vehicles were fitted with N&V testing equipment and tested by GDUKLS while being driven back to barracks.
- **Speed Gate Testing** – On return to barracks the same five vehicles were tested using a set test criterion that was used during growth and reliability trials. This allowed for comparison of results from similar tests conducted with vehicles with no defects.
- **Representative Testing** – With no negative results from the first two tests a further N&V test was developed. Using information from the users and exercise data the 23 vehicles were tested over a route that replicated the ground conditions, speeds and driving behaviours from Mission 3 of EX TS. For this test the sensors attached to the vehicles were moved to record N&V where it was felt by the user. The route was 20km, split over metalled roads, tracks and cross country.

- **People Evidence** – Concurrent with the early inspections and N&V testing ASIT interviewed 43 service personnel who were on Ex TS. The information allowed ASIT to build a picture of what people were doing when symptoms presented. The time spent on the vehicles, whether doing maintenance, resting, driving, or stationary in over-watch became relevant. This coupled with the 45-point inspection results drove changes to N&V testing and allowed for additional lines of enquiry to be developed.
- **Air Quality within Vehicles** – Multiple people informed the team that the inside of the vehicles smelt of fumes when hatches were opened after prolonged non-use. This coupled with information gathered regarding auxiliary power unit reliability and collective protection / environmental control system (COLPRO/ECS) functionality drove a series of tests. It was found that volatile organic substances were present within the vehicle and that CO₂ was able to build to unsafe levels if hatches and COLPRO/ECS were not configured as directed in policy and guidance documents. The effects of exposure to one or both of these conditions are similar to those symptoms experienced on EX TS.
- **Noise** – It has been proven that the issued hearing protection (HP) when serviceable, correctly fitted and correctly worn protects the user. From interviews and information gathered post the investigation it was identified that the dual layer system is uncomfortable, restrictive and often users do not wear it. Additionally, the transition between different types of HP and



Bowman communication box switches

the requirement to wear HP while sleeping close to running vehicles creates additional risk of exposure. This coupled with broken switches, incorrectly adjusted volumes and disconnection of cables were all relevant to the noise exposure symptoms reported.

INVESTIGATION CONCLUSIONS

- **Having focused the investigation on the symptoms presented it is clear there was no single root cause. The effects felt was a combination of multiple causal factors, each of which had multiple contributing factors.**
- **All service personnel operating the vehicles were correctly trained and qualified in their individual roles, however, varying levels of individual and collective experience existed within the user group. This coupled with operating a new complex platform which was still being developed, while operating in adverse conditions on a validation exercise, was a large contributing factor.**
- **Some crews were applying tried and tested maintenance and operating procedures from previous armoured vehicles that would not have created the reported symptoms. Ajax is not as forgiving.**
- **Therefore, the overarching lesson from the investigation is that standard operating instruction for Ajax must be fully adhered too. If a situation arises, then the crews must stop and get the issues resolved.**
- **The ASIT investigation recommendations combined with other enquiries and already planned improvements has enabled a structured return to use of Ajax. The combined efforts will result in a platform which will fully meet its potential and the expectations of the Army.**



DATA ANALYSIS OF ROAD TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS AND COLLISIONS


The Safety Organisational Learning and Army Reporting (SOLAR) team outlines valuable insight from MySafety reporting data

MySafety data indicates that reported road traffic collisions (RTCs) rose sharply from early 2025 – why was this? From 1 April 2025, MySafety reporting was expanded to capture RTCs involving MOD-provided vehicles and personally owned vehicles used for business purposes or on the Defence estate. This greater visibility contributed to the rise in recorded incidents, which peaked in late 2025 before beginning to decline after March 2026.


Most reported RTCs involved damage only (1,106), followed by Slight (179), Serious (46) and Fatal (2). Both fatalities were civilians. Of concern, 408 reports contained no severity information, making 'Blank' the second-largest category. Addressing these gaps is essential to provide an accurate picture of RTC severity, strengthen trend analysis and support targeted safety interventions.

Moving forward and hitting a static object / parked vehicle is the largest collision type (353). Reversing and hitting a static object / parked vehicle is the second-largest collision type (280). Together, these two categories account for 633 RTC records, suggesting that low-speed manoeuvring, reversing, spatial judgement, and vehicle positioning are likely to be 'high-value' prevention themes.



Monthly count by collision severity



RTA / RTC monthly reported volume




Collision severity distribution




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
Top collision types




Top precipitating factors




Top contributing factor codes




On MOD property



Weather conditions



Road surface conditions



Judgement of width, distance, position, and manoeuvre aligns with the high volume of static-object and parked-vehicle impacts. From a prevention perspective, the data points towards targeted interventions focused on reversing discipline, banksman or marshaller use where applicable, vehicle familiarisation, confined-space manoeuvring, and width or distance judgement.

A total of 1,039 collisions are coded as not occurring on MOD property, compared with 701 recorded as on and 1 blank record. Tarmac is the most common road surface (1,074), however, the road surface field is blank in 464 records. Weather also has a large blank component (580), followed by Sunny (504), Overcast (276), Raining (180), Other (172), Snow (26).

The level of blank or missing data across several key fields limits the analytical value of the collision dataset, reduces confidence in trend analysis, makes it harder to understand contributing factors, and weakens the evidence base for safety recommendations. While completing every field may take additional time, this information is important because it helps build a clearer picture, improves assurance, and supports more meaningful analysis.

Completing all fields on MySafety may take slightly more time upfront, but it helps reduce rework later. MySafety data gives the Army a clearer understanding of collision factors and supports stronger, evidence-based safety recommendations. Keep reports factual, accurate, and evidence-based.

RTCs are not inevitable – they are preventable. By slowing down, using a trained marshal where needed, improving manoeuvring discipline, and reporting incidents accurately on MySafety, the Army can turn trend analysis into real action.

Better data, better decisions, and safer driving will reduce damage, protect our people, and preserve capability.

If you are unsure what to record, contact SOLAR at ASG-SC-SOLAR-Mailbox@mod.gov.uk.



BACK TO BASICS – OR IS IT?

Contributed by
WO1 Antonio (Tony)
Brunetti RLC,
Command Master Driver

From a Master Driver perspective, driving safety is not simply about licences, vehicles, or policy, it is about culture, judgement and personal responsibility.

Every journey we undertake reflects not only on us as individuals, but on the Army as a whole. The standard we set behind the wheel matters. At its core, a strong driving culture is built on doing the **basics** well and doing them consistently.

Based on data drawn from MySafety – ‘most road traffic collisions are not the result of complex failures or lack of technical skill; they stem from **basic** errors and poor decisions’.

Driving while tired, distracted, rushing unnecessarily or underestimating conditions are all examples of fundamentals being overlooked. Getting back to **basics** means recognising risk early and having the discipline to adjust behaviour accordingly. Sometimes that means slowing down, delaying a journey, changing a route, or deciding not to drive at all.

One of the most critical **basic** decisions concerns alcohol. The message is straightforward: if you are driving, alcohol has no place in the equation. Even small amounts impair judgement, reaction time and situational awareness long before legal limits are reached. As professional soldiers, we should not aim to meet the minimum legal standard, but to exceed it. Planning ahead, using alternatives and being honest with ourselves and others are simple actions, but they are fundamental to safe driving. The right decision is often inconvenient, but it is always the safest one.

Personal responsibility also begins before the engine is started. The **basics** matter: Am I fit to drive? Is the vehicle fit to be driven? Do I understand the route and conditions? Weather, fatigue, unfamiliar roads, and pressure to “just get it done” all increase risk. Taking a few minutes to conduct basic checks, plan the route, and think ahead can prevent hours of disruption or far worse.

Driving safety is not just an individual responsibility; it is a collective one. Challenging unsafe behaviour, supporting peers and reinforcing good habits are all part of maintaining standards. If something doesn't feel right, speak up. If a driver is not fit, stop the task. That is not weakness it is professionalism and leadership in action.

Experience alone does not make us immune to mistakes. Confidence is valuable, but complacency is dangerous. Whether driving a military platform or a private vehicle, the fundamentals remain unchanged: obey the law, respect conditions, manage speed and stay alert. When we drift away from these **basics**, risk quickly increases.



Ultimately, safe driving comes down to everyday choices. Every time we turn the key, we choose whether to apply the basics properly and take responsibility for ourselves, our passengers, and those who share the road with us. As Master Drivers, we reinforce this message not through policy alone, but through our behaviour.

The goal is simple: do the basics well, make the right decisions, and arrive safely every time.

Related Video Shorts

Army Vehicle Reversing and Manoeuvring
<https://jive.defencegateway.mod.uk/videos/52465>

Army Vehicle Speed
<https://jive.defencegateway.mod.uk/videos/51952>

Army Convoy Discipline
<https://jive.defencegateway.mod.uk/videos/49616>



SAFE TO FIGHT 25 UPDATE

Contributed by Maj Anthony Dale MBE, SO2 TED, Army Safety Group

Since introduction of SAFE TO FIGHT 25 (STF25) on 03 Nov 25, it is demonstrating tangible progress in strengthening the Army's Safety Culture.

Rooted in the moral component of fighting power, STF25 continues to reinforce the importance of morale, leadership, cohesion, and an ethical foundation aligned to Army values and standards.

Engagement across 2* formations and below has been strong, with over 165 Regular / Reserve units adopting STF25's discussion-led approach to embed safety into daily activity. Increasingly, a culture is emerging that prioritises keeping our people safe, ready, and deployable – not as a compliance requirement, but as a core element of operational effectiveness. The window for Regular units has now closed, whilst Reserve units have until 3 Nov 26 to complete this.

Why STF25 Matters

Evidence suggests STF25 is successfully reframing safety as a combat enabler rather than a constraint. Commanders and soldiers alike are demonstrating a more mature understanding of the balance between **mission command, risk, and realism**.

The application of managing risk to As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) remains central, but is now more

consistently informed by open dialogue, improved reporting behaviours, and a growing trust in the system. Importantly, safety is no longer viewed solely through process, but through people – enabled by a culture that is increasingly flexible, informed, and willing to learn.

What STF25 Delivered and Continues to Deliver

The five core themes remain unchanged:

- Why Safety Matters – Outcome: Link safety, Army culture and fighting power.
- Risk Management (COHORT 1) – Outcome: Understand your safety responsibilities and those of the Army.
- Risk Management (COHORT 2) – Outcome: Understand core elements of a Safe System of Work (SSW).
- Just Culture – Outcome: Understand the experience of a fatal accident from a CO's perspective.
- Reporting Culture – Outcome: Understand MySafety, terminology and identification of occurrences that require reporting.
- Organisational Learning (OL) – Outcome: Understand OL Intent.

What has evolved is how these are being experienced. **Units are now leading more confident, honest discussions**, with facilitators enabling meaningful engagement rather than simply delivering content.

Dr James Reason's 'Swiss Cheese' safety culture model continues to underpin delivery, but its principles are now being actively lived – particularly in the strengthening of reporting and learning behaviours at unit level.

Overall Feedback So Far

STF25 is delivering measurable positive outcomes:

Valuable Learning & Awareness:

- Improved understanding of:
 - Safety culture.
 - Risk management.
 - Reporting processes.
- Seen as a good refresher even for experienced personnel.

Strong Engagement Through Discussion:

- Interactive elements widely praised:
 - Group discussions.
 - Sharing experiences across ranks.
- Helped:
 - Reinforce learning.
 - Built shared understanding.

Real-World Examples Were Effective:

- Case studies (especially incident-based videos) were:
 - Engaging.
 - Memorable.
 - Useful for learning.

Flexible Delivery:

- Units appreciated ability to tailor content to their context.
- Facilitators often adapted material effectively.

These outcomes indicate STF25 is continuing to shift behaviours from compliance-driven activity towards genuine commitment.

What Next?

The priority now is **sustainment and normalisation**. STF25 principles must remain embedded in routine activity: training, operations, and daily decision-making.

Leaders should continue to challenge themselves:

- *Are we maintaining the confidence to report?*
- *Are we acting on what we learn?*
- *Are we reinforcing a fair and just culture?*

There is also an opportunity to deepen impact – moving beyond awareness towards **instinctive safe behaviours, embedded in our DNA** and across all levels of command.

As reinforced in ongoing messaging: safety is not a separate function, but integral to how we operate. Sustained leadership focus will ensure STF25 continues to enhance both safety and operational effectiveness across the Army.

Thank you to all of you that completed the Feedback (Facilitator Registration, Unit / Department Lead, Initial Survey, Closing Survey). This has allowed ASG-SC to look at where the Army currently are, what the ongoing journey looks like, and what future STF training days could be delivered.



EXPLOITING RISK TO WIN THE FIGHT

1 (UK) DIVISION'S APPROACH TO SAFETY

Contributed by Tony Richards,
S01 Force Protection, 1st (UK) Division


1 (UK) Div comprises the UK's light and airborne forces and, by virtue of its strategic and operational agility, will often be first to the fight.

Some may question what a light division can achieve against the pacing threat, or how light and airborne forces can withstand the mass and momentum of Russia's predominantly armoured forces. The conflict in Ukraine has reaffirmed the value of armour on the battlefield. But it has also shown that ubiquitous lethality has narrowed the gap between light, airborne and armoured forces; 70–80% of total casualties in the war are now caused by drones. 1 (UK) Div is therefore being equipped at pace with relatively inexpensive, attributable and consumable capabilities, including drones that amplify its inherent strengths.

The breadth of the Division's activity is striking, spanning everything from Live Agent Training to High Altitude Parachuting and reflecting a force designed not merely to respond to events, but to shape them. Yet readiness and ambition carry risk. These are not routine undertakings conducted in controlled conditions; they are demanding, complex and often delivered against a backdrop of uncertainty, driven in real time by G3 demand. At a time when geopolitical developments evolve rapidly and operational requirements shift just as fast, effective risk management is not a bureaucratic necessity, but an operational imperative. It is what allows the Division to maintain momentum, preserve fighting power and continue to deliver challenging activity safely while retaining its licence to operate.

At the heart of this approach is a simple but powerful mantra: 'Exploiting Risk to Win the Fight'. It reflects the Division's understanding that operational success does not come from avoiding risk altogether, but from understanding it, framing it and using it intelligently. By operationalising risk management, the FP team gives commanders and soldiers the context they need to make sound decisions in demanding tactical environments. This is not risk management as a brake on action; it is risk management as an enabler of tempo, initiative and combat realism. It brings clarity to uncertainty, allowing activity to mirror the pressures of operations, where decisions must often be taken quickly, confidently and with incomplete information to secure advantage.

For significant activities, that philosophy is translated into practice through the creation of a Safe Operating Envelope (SOE). The SOE defines the conceptual battlespace within which an activity will be conducted. Beneath it sits a foundational risk assessment that



identifies the principal hazards, determines where tighter controls are required, and shapes the narrative for an all ranks safety brief delivered to every participant. Once an activity crosses the start line, the risk assessment becomes a living framework.

Continued...




Commanders, staff and soldiers operate within it, making dynamic adjustments inside agreed risk thresholds and escalating risk when required so that activity remains within a Safe System of Work (SSW). In this way, risk management is not confined to planning tables or paperwork; it becomes a shared operational discipline, understood across the force and applied in real time.

That methodology was demonstrated powerfully on Ex STEADFAST DART, a NATO exercise conducted in Romania from January to March 2025. This was no small undertaking. It brought together three brigades and approximately 5,500 troops, operating across vast distances in punishing environmental conditions, where

terrain, climate and movement combined to create a constantly shifting risk picture. The SOE developed for the exercise gave commanders an immediate visual understanding of where the greatest hazards lay. Through clear, colour-coded segments, it showed where risk thresholds were highest and where control measures might need to be tightened or adapted as conditions changed. In an environment where weather, road conditions and the sheer scale of manoeuvre could quickly alter the balance of risk, that clarity mattered. It allowed leaders to act quickly, make informed judgements and maintain operational momentum without losing sight of safety.



Ex STEADFAST DART 25 – Safe Operating Envelope (SOE) - Risk Overview



Risk Score of 6 = (Likelihood) Unlikely to happen but could occur at some time x **(Impact)** Single life changing injury/injury requiring medical attention.

Risk Score of 9 = (Likelihood) Fairly likely to occur at some time or some circumstances x **(Impact)** Single life changing injury/injury requiring medical attention.

Risk Score of 12/15 = (Likelihood) Fairly likely to occur at some time or some circumstances x **(Impact)** Fatality/Multiple life-threatening injuries or Multiple fatalities/life changing injuries

Behind these major activities stands the routine but vital work of the 1 (UK) Division FP team. Working closely with brigades and units across the formation, they provide expert Safety Risk Management advice that helps training teams and commanders deliver demanding activity with confidence. Their influence is felt not only during large-scale exercises, but also in the day-to-day preparation that sustains readiness across the Division.

Each year, as directed by the GOC between September and December, the team delivers FP roadshows to refresh SRM knowledge for brigade and unit training staff, particularly after the summer churn of personnel. This recurring effort renews understanding, sustains standards and ensures the Division remains ready to operate at speed. In a formation defined by readiness and reach, the FP team's contribution is both quiet and critical: enabling the Division to train hard, move fast and fight effectively while keeping risk understood, controlled and exploited to advantage and preserving its licence to operate.



ARMY MARITIME SAFETY MANAGEMENT

FROM AD HOC TO ASSURED

Contributed by Bill Dawson MSc,
Chief Maritime Officer (Army)
Capability Directorate, Army HQ

Three years ago, we could not reliably demonstrate that Army Maritime activity was being conducted safely. Our maritime capability is small, specialist and despite being a critical enabling activity (we live on an Island!) is often out of sight. We operate in inherently hazardous environments where boats, water, weather and machinery combine to create real risk.

Until recently, the way units managed that risk was inconsistent. There were pockets of good practice, but no coherent safety management system, limited assurance, and little ability to provide structured, defensible evidence of safe operations.

That position has changed significantly. Recent assurance activity has shown how far the system has matured: a more structured approach is now identifying systemic weaknesses that were previously unknown, unmanaged or hidden within local practice. In some cases, fundamental safety controls were not being fully understood or applied. The difference is that these issues are now exposed, recorded and addressed through a coherent framework, driving a steady reduction in risk and greater consistency across the capability.

Today, Army Maritime operates within a clear Safety and Environmental Management framework, built on ACSO 1200 and delivered through ACSO 1203. This provides, for the first time, a coherent structure for managing risk, defining responsibilities and assuring safety.

At the heart of this is the Maritime Safety and Environment Management System (MSEMS). It draws on recognised best practice from the global

maritime community, including the ISO 9000 series and the International Safety Management (ISM) Code, recognising that the commercial sector operates at a far greater scale and that we must learn from it. To keep the system accessible, it is built around four principles: Safe People, Safe Equipment, Safe Practices and Safe Place.

Alongside this, a stronger assurance regime has been established. Through Second Line of Defence Assurance, we now routinely assess units to determine not only whether equipment is “safe to operate”, but whether units are actually “operating safely”. Not surprisingly this leads to operational effectiveness: remember – safety is an enabler.

Crucially, this is also generating consistent and repeatable evidence of good safety practice, operator competence and currency, and assurance that commanders can rely on when making risk-based decisions.

A key enabler has been the Maritime Safety Management System tracker. It provides a coherent view of safety activity across the capability, capturing findings, tracking actions and

giving visibility of risk that previously did not exist. For commanders and Senior NCOs, this delivers practical value: confidence, supported by evidence and data, that equipment is safe and people are operating safely, while enabling trends to be identified and risk prioritised. Safety is therefore actively managed rather than assumed.

Looking ahead, the opportunity is not just to manage safety, but to exploit the data we are collecting. As systems mature, digital dashboards and AI-enabled tools can help analyse trends, identify emerging risks and support better decisions. What was once anecdotal is becoming evidence-led insight.

Since 2024, Army Maritime has moved from a largely unstructured approach with limited assurance to a coherent system with defined standards and growing evidence of control. That progress builds confidence, strengthens decision-making and delivers safer, more effective maritime operations.

Minimum Required to go to sea														
No.	Rank	Name	CEG	ISSC/BSSC	Maritime Whole-Body Vibration	VHF	RYA First Aid level 2	First Aid level 2	MST	Power Boat L2 Certificate	First Aid Certificate	Advance Power Boat	RYA Radar Certificate	RYA Sa Boat C
SP to have RYA FA or FA L2														
10563286	SSgt	BROWN	Mariner 1	01-Apr-27	20-Nov-26	Yes	12-May-28	14-Dec-26	Yes	Yes	Yes			
47638956	Sgt	GREEN	Mariner 1	17-May-29	29-Apr-27	Yes	12-May-28	02-Sep-25	Yes	Yes	Yes			
8762654	Sgt	BLACK	Mariner 1	14-Jul-28	26-May-27	Yes	10-Oct-28		Yes	Yes	Yes			
74653748	Sgt	PURPLE	Mariner 1	25-Jun-31	01-Nov-26	Yes	12-May-28	14-Dec-26	Yes	Yes	Yes			
984572547	Sgt	CYAN	Mariner 1	20-Dec-29	09-Jan-27	Yes	28-Nov-28		Yes	Yes	Yes			
89537624	Sgt	ORANGE	Mariner 1	28-Feb-30	09-Jan-27	Yes	28-Nov-28	01-May-28	Yes	Yes	Yes			
86753542	Cpl	WHITE	Mariner 1	10-Jun-27	08-Jan-27	Yes			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
89647354	Cpl	RED	Mariner 3	12-Dec-30	04-Jun-27	Yes			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
97853831	LCpl	BLUE	Mariner 2	13-May-27	18-Nov-26	Yes		15-Mar-25	Yes	Yes	Yes			Yes
74635243	LCpl	YELLOW	Mariner 2	11-Feb-27	02-Sep-26	Yes		02-May-27	Yes	Yes	Yes			
85735468	LCpl	PINK	Mariner 3	25-Nov-27	21-Apr-27	Yes	01/09/2027	22-Jan-29	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
58769463	LCpl	OCHRE	Mariner 3	13-Dec-29	18-Nov-26	Yes	09-Apr-28		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
75863758	LCpl	RUSSET	Mariner 2	20-Feb-31	18-Nov-26	Yes	28-Nov-28	28-Jul-25	Yes	Yes	Yes			
58364593	LCpl	LAVENDER	Mariner 2	24-Apr-31	18-Nov-26	Yes	08/05/2028	25-May-26	Yes	Yes	Yes			
76583658	LCpl	BEIGE	Mariner 2	03-Dec-26	18-Nov-26	Yes	28-Nov-28	23-Nov-26	Yes	Yes	Yes			
47586398	LCpl	TURQUOISE	Mariner 2	14-May-26	09-Jan-27	Yes		13-Jun-27	Yes	Yes	Yes			Yes



NOISE AND ORGANISATIONAL LEARNING LESSONS FROM CHINOOK

Contributed by Wg Cdr Alexander Blacklock,
SO1 Avn Med, Safety, Joint Aviation Command HQ

While the Chinook platform is not unique in presenting a noise risk, Chinook Force's recent experience provides a valuable case study in how we recognise, understand, and learn from that risk at an organisational level.

Awareness of noise as a hazard in Defence has increased in recent years, driven in part by a rise in claims from retired personnel relating to Noise-Induced Hearing Loss. However, recognising a hazard is not the same as managing it effectively.

In summer 2025, the Chinook Force at RAF Odiham was issued with a Health and Safety Executive (HSE) Crown Improvement Notice (CIN) relating to noise. Crucially, this was not due to a lack of awareness or absence of controls. The issue was that understanding and the resulting controls were not captured within a single, coherent Noise Risk Assessment (NRA).

This highlights a key Organisational Learning point: **Awareness does not equal understanding.** Risk must be clearly articulated, integrated, understood and managed.

The HSE required that the response to the CIN involve the development of a comprehensive NRA that brought together all sources of noise, including:

- Ambient platform noise.
- Communication system noise.
- Impulse noise from weapons.

Only by combining these elements is it possible to generate a complete picture of the noise risk and assess whether controls are effective.

The HSE wanted to see data driving understanding. For example, audiometry provides insight into the impact of noise exposure on an individual, and if that data is pooled it can allow commanders and safety leaders to see trends allowing them to assess control measures. Defence Statistics (DefStats) can support this data analysis.

Noise management is also a human factors issue. Personnel are a critical part of the control system, particularly through the correct use of hearing protection and communication equipment. HSE wanted to see training delivered to ensure personnel understand the risks, the purpose of controls, and their role in making them effective.

The Chinook experience highlights the challenge of organisational stove-pipes. Noise risk spans engineering, medical, operational, and safety domains, which can lead to fragmented ownership.

Effective management requires these elements to be integrated into a single, coherent NRA enabling commanders to understand the risks. These risks can then be owned and if needed elevated, and the understanding shared across Defence allowing other activities and platforms to do the same.

Ultimately, Defence activity will always involve noise, and in conflict higher levels of noise exposure may be accepted by senior risk owners. However, in training and routine activity, we must demonstrate that we understand our exposure, have implemented effective controls to keep exposure within HSE guidelines, train our people appropriately and continuously review our understanding based on evidence and learning.

Do You Have:

- A comprehensive Noise Risk Assessment demonstrating a full understanding of all your noise sources, your mitigations, and your plans to improve your noise understanding?
- Training to ensure personnel understand noise risks and their critical role in mitigating them?
- A process to pool audiometry data to allow for trend analysis that can be fed back into the NRA?

Who Can Help?

- DefStats can assist in data collection/analysis.
- Your Chief Environmental and Safety Officer (CESO) can provide guidance and point you in the direction of the right subject matter experts.



SAFETY CASE EVOLUTION

Contributed by Maj Nicholas Anderson, D Progs Programme Integration

The evolution of the safety case reflects a fundamental shift in how safety is assured in increasingly fast-paced and complex acquisition environments.

Traditionally, safety cases were developed alongside bespoke equipment programmes, where long design cycles allowed for detailed hazard identification, iterative testing, and comprehensive assurance activities embedded throughout the system lifecycle. However, the modern defence landscape characterised by rapid procurement, especially through Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) solutions has required a more agile, adaptive, and structured approach to safety assurance.



One of the most important changes is the transition from documentation heavy safety cases to evidence led, risk informed arguments. In legacy systems, safety cases often became large, static reports produced late in the lifecycle, sometimes seen as compliance artefacts rather than decision support tools. Today, a modern safety case is expected to be a living construct, a structured argument, supported by evidence, that clearly demonstrates how risks are identified, reduced, and managed to a tolerable level. This shift improves transparency and enables stakeholders including duty holders and regulators to understand not just what the risks are, but why they are acceptable.

A second key change lies in the handling of uncertainty and incomplete information. When procuring COTS / Rapid Acquisition equipment, organisations frequently lack full design assurance data or detailed insight into the original engineering intent. The updated safety case approach acknowledges this reality by emphasising proportionality and risk prioritisation. Rather than delaying capability delivery until perfect information is available, and in the absence of a comprehensive safety case, relative safety documentation can incorporate assumptions, constraints, and operational mitigations more explicitly.



This allows for informed decision-making under uncertainty, while still maintaining safety integrity, ultimately feeding back into the main body safety case.

The evolution also reflects a greater emphasis on context. Previously, safety assessments focused heavily on the intrinsic safety of the equipment. Modern safety cases place increased weight on the operational environment, user behaviour, and integration into wider systems of systems, bringing a wider awareness of safety within the function, in this case usually concentrating of software deliverables. This is particularly important for COTS equipment, where safety cannot be assessed in isolation but must consider how it will be used, maintained, and supported within military operations. This broader perspective reduces the risk of repeating historical incidents where equipment was technically compliant but unsafe in practice.

Another important development is the integration of safety with wider assurance disciplines, including environmental protection, cybersecurity (secure by design), and human factors. It is important to realise that safety cases are no longer standalone products; they are increasingly aligned with enterprise level frameworks and management systems. This integration supports more coherent decision-making and ensures that safety trade-offs are visible and managed alongside other operational considerations.

Critically, these changes support innovation rather than hinder it. A well-structured, proportionate safety case enables faster deployment of new capabilities by providing a clear framework for identifying and managing risk early. It helps prevent the repetition of past mistakes by capturing lessons learned and embedding them into future programmes. At the same time, it avoids unnecessary burden by focusing effort where it delivers the most value on the highest risks and most critical controls.

In summary, the evolution of the safety case is essential to keeping pace with modern acquisition practices. By moving towards structured, evidence based, and context driven approaches, safety cases now play a central role in enabling safe innovation, supporting rapid capability delivery, and maintaining trust in defence systems.



ASG TEAM MEMBER PROFILE

CAT LINTELL

Contributed by Catherine Lintell, HEO Safety Organisational Learning and Army Reporting (SOLAR), Army Safety Group

I don't mind looking silly if it means being safe.

I thought about writing a profile that focused on my career path and what eventually led me back to working with the MOD – but the truth is, the story below explains it far better than any time-line ever could.

Safety isn't just part of my job – it's part of my life story. By the time this article is published, it will mark the 44th anniversary of the Falklands War, the conflict that took my dad's life. He was killed in action three months before I was born, which means I never had the chance to meet him.

I grew up knowing him only through stories, photographs, and the quiet weight of a loss that shaped my entire life. That experience is why I speak about safety with conviction. It's why I believe so strongly in doing the right thing, following the rules, and making decisions that protect not just ourselves, but the families who wait for us at home.

When I look at a task, a training area, or a workplace, I don't just see equipment or procedures – I see people. I see futures. I see the ripple effect that one shortcut, one rushed moment, or one "it'll be fine" decision can create. I know what it feels like to grow up without a parent because of military service, and I never want another family to face that kind of lifelong impact.

For me, safety is built on a simple but powerful principle: do the right thing. Not the quickest thing. Not the easiest thing. The right thing. Policies, rules, and procedures aren't there to slow us down – they're there because someone, somewhere, paid the price for the lesson they teach. When we follow them, we honour those who didn't make it home. When we ignore them, we risk repeating history.

I'm the kind of person who notices the small things: the missing guard,



the blocked walkway, the rushed job, the quiet pressure to cut corners. I speak up not to criticise, but because I care. Because doing the right thing in the moment can be the difference between going home safely or changing a family's life forever.

I thrive in fast paced, high pressure environments, but I never let the pace override the principles. Safety doesn't slow the mission; it protects the people who make the mission possible. It builds confidence, strengthens capability, and ensures readiness.

People are at the heart of my approach. I listen, I learn, and I involve others. Safety becomes culture only when everyone feels ownership. When people feel heard, they speak up. When they understand the "why," they follow the "how." When they feel valued, they look out for each other.

I also believe in continuous improvement. Safety evolves, and so must we. I encourage open conversations, honest reporting, and learning from near misses – not to assign blame, but to prevent harm.

At my core, I'm driven by a truth I've lived with my entire life: every soldier deserves to go home to their family. My dad didn't get that chance. That loss fuels my determination to make sure others do. Safety isn't just a responsibility – it's a promise.

And one day, when I've built the confidence, I hope to follow in his footsteps in my own way – by doing a parachute jump, safely. Not out of recklessness, but out of respect. Out of connection. Out of honour for the dad, I never got to meet.



TRAINING AND EDUCATION DELIVERY (TED) UPDATE

Contributed by Maj Anthony Dale MBE, SO2 TED, Army Safety Group

Course updates are managed in accordance with ACSO 3245 to ensure Army safety training remains current, relevant, and aligned to operational and firm base requirements.

The TED model shown in **Table 1** sets out the portfolio of courses owned by the Army Safety Centre (AScen). Delivery is provided through a combination of external training establishments and Army Force Protection Advisors (AFPAs), enabling units to access training through the most appropriate delivery route.

Training Support Tool

The former Unit Safety Advisor (USA) and Unit Safety Manager (USM) courses have been reviewed to ensure they remain fit for purpose and meet the needs of today's Army. As a result, the USA course has been replaced by the Unit Safety Advisor Facilities and Environment (USAFE) course, delivered at the Defence College of Support (DCSp) and booked through TARGET. The revised USAFE course is delivered over one week, reducing the duration from the previous two-week model and delivering associated efficiencies in travel and subsistence, as well as reduced nights out of bed.



The USM course has been replaced by the Risk Safety Advisor (RSA) course, which is delivered through Defence Learning Environment (DLE). This change has reduced the training burden from a one-week residential course to a short, accessible online package, while retaining the core learning required to support unit safety management.

The Risk Safety Manager (RSM) course is a two-day package that provides safety risk management training for both operational activity and the firm base. It is designed to support personnel with responsibility for managing and assuring risk within their area of command or responsibility.

The Environmental and Facilities Manager (EFM) course is a two-day package focused on firm base environmental and facilities management. It provides personnel with the knowledge required to support compliance, local assurance activity, and effective management of environmental and facilities-related risks.

Table 1: AScen Training and Education Delivery Portfolio

	Safety Risk Management	Environmental and Facilities	Fire Prevention
Advisor	Risk Safety Advisor (RSA) Delivered via DLE SRM Leader Delivered on WO2 ALDP/ JOTAC/JOTAC(R) Officer courses	Unit Safety Advisor (Facilities & Environment) USAFE Delivered at DCSp and booked via TARGET	Fire Prevention Safety Advisor (FPSA) Delivered at DFTU and booked via Trg Support Tool or Fire Din
Manager	Risk Safety Manager (RSM) Force Protection Investigator (FPI) Both delivered at 'Point of Need' and booked via the Training Support Tool SRM Practitioner Delivered on Cpl ALDP/ RMAS Officer trg	Environmental & Facilities Manager (EFM) Manual Handling Trainer Both delivered at 'Point of Need' and booked via the Training Support Tool	Fire Prevention Safety Manager (FPSM) Both delivered at 'Point of Need' and booked via the Training Support Tool DSEAR Bespoke courses delivered by AScen
Practitioner	Risk Assessor Delivered on LCpl ALDP/ RMAS Officer trg	COSHH Assessor Manual Handling Assessor Shelving / Racking and Ladders Portable Appliance Tester (PAT) All delivered at 'Point of Need' and booked via the Training Support Tool Waste Warden Via DLE	Fire Prevention Safety Practitioner (FPSP) Delivered at 'Point of Need' by Unit FPSMs.



Continued...

Table 2: Career Course SRM Pre-requisites

Serial	Professional Military Education / Training	Safety Risk Management course delivered			JPA Competency Awarded	Recommended Delivery Agent	Course Pre-requisite
		Risk Assessor	Practitioner	Leader			
1	Basic Training	—	—	—	—		N/A
2	LCpl ADLP	✓	—	—	✓	Army Force Protection Advisor (default) or Risk Assessment Trainer	Nil
3	Cpl ALDP MT	—	✓	—	✓	Army Force Protection Advisor (default) or Safety Risk Assessment Trainer	Risk Assessor
4	Sgt ALDP MT	—	Refresher training	—	—		Risk Assessor & Practitioner
5	WO ALDP	—	—	✓	✓		Risk Assessor & Practitioner
6	RSM Designate Course	—	—	Refresher training	—		Risk Assessor & Practitioner & Leader
7	Commissioning Courses	✓	✓	—	✓		Nil
8	LEOC	—	—	Refresher training	—		Risk Assessor & Practitioner & Leader
9	JOTAC/JOTAC(R)	—	—	—	✓		Risk Assessor & Practitioner
10	SUCMC	—	—	Refresher training	—	DACOS Performance and Force Protection HQ Fd Army	Risk Assessor & Practitioner & Leader
11	CODC	—	—	Refresher training	—	AHd Safety ASG	Risk Assessor & Practitioner & Leader

Table 2 lists the pre-requisites required to attend refresher training delivered during Sgt / WO1 ALDP and Officers LEOC.

All courses are aligned to the requirements of the Army Safety and Environmental Management System Assurance (ASEMSA) and support units in maintaining suitably trained personnel across safety, environmental, facilities, and fire prevention disciplines.

The **Training Support Tool** provides a single point of access for Army safety training requirements. It enables units to notify training deliverers of forecast demand during the annual training requirement windows in January and July, allowing courses to be planned and generated against unit need. Courses delivered at 'point of need' can be booked directly through the tool, while links are provided for courses delivered by external colleges or other training providers.



CLIMATE CHANGE AND SUSTAINABILITY UPDATES

Contributed by Sharon Bareham, Directorate of Basing and Infrastructure

ARMY UNITS AWARDED FOR DRIVING UTILITY SAVINGS

Small actions across the Army estate are adding up to something significant.

Since its launch in 2022, the Army's Utility Savings Challenge (USC) has generated more than £36M in savings, demonstrating the scale of impact that simple, practical behaviour change can achieve. By reducing energy and water consumption, units across the Army are cutting costs, lowering environmental impact and helping to ensure resources are focused on operational priorities and improving local infrastructure.

Collectively, these savings are significant. To put this into context, £36M is comparable to the cost of funding the six major Battlegroup-level validation training exercises for 4th Light Brigade (The Black Rats) and 7th Light Mechanised Brigade (The Desert Rats) in the UK, Germany and Kenya for a whole training year – underlining the real operational value of efficient resource management.

These achievements reflect a whole force effort. Soldiers, civil servants and industry partners have all played their part, embedding everyday behaviours that reduce demand, strengthen resilience and support the Army in an increasingly resource constrained environment.

Major General AJ Smith CBE, Director of Basing & Infrastructure and the Army's Sustainability Champion, said: *"These exceptional results demonstrate the power of collective action. By working together to drive behaviour change and responsible resource management, we are embedding a culture of sustainability that will deliver long term benefit. Congratulations to this year's winners and thank you to everyone who contributed."*

Gold, silver and bronze awards have been presented to the highest-performing units, with winners receiving an uplift to their Local Infrastructure Improvement Fund (LIIF) allocation – enabling them to reinvest directly in estate improvements that enhance the lived experience of their people. Previous winners have used their funding to upgrade kitchens and dining facilities, improve gym areas and refurbish communal spaces.

2025/26 USC Winners

1st Place: Defence Training Estate (DTE) Germany and Norway (awarded £50K). Recognised for embedding energy and water efficiency within large-scale redevelopment, demonstrating that sustainability and major reinvestment can go hand in hand.

2nd Place: Imber Lines, Warminster (LTF(W) Imber Lines) (awarded £30K). An exemplar of what strong leadership and clear focus can achieve, setting the standard for energy efficiency across the estate.

Joint 3rd Place: Brompton Barracks, Chatham (1 RSME) (awarded £20K). Commended for overcoming the constraints of a historic site to deliver impressive and sustained efficiency improvements.

Joint 3rd Place: St David's Barracks, Bicester (1 RLC) (awarded £20K). Recognised for keeping energy efficiency central to a significant programme of transformation, underpinned by strong planning and leadership.

As the challenge moves into 2026/27, units across the Army are already developing new approaches to push savings further – improving energy efficiency, strengthening resilience and reducing environmental impact, while ensuring resources remain focused where they matter most: supporting an Army that is ready to fight and win.

For more information and utility saving tips visit: <https://jive.defencegateway.mod.uk/groups/directorate-basing-infrastructure/projects/utilities-saving-challenge/pages/enter>.

Continued...





Representatives from DIO, the British Army, Mitie, and Mott MacDonald at the ground-breaking ceremony at Basingbourn Barracks

POWERING THE ARMY'S FUTURE

Project PROMETHEUS continues to deliver greener energy across the estate.

From new solar farms breaking ground to rooftop arrays quietly powering daily activity, Project PROMETHEUS is transforming how the Army generates and uses energy. Across the estate, these projects are reducing carbon emissions, strengthening energy resilience, and supporting the Army's Net Zero targets.

At Basingbourn Barracks, the next chapter is already underway. A ground-breaking ceremony in March 2026 marked the start of construction on a £3.9M solar array, delivered by the

Defence Infrastructure Organisation (DIO) under Project PROMETHEUS, in partnership with Custom Solar (Mitie Power & Grid).

Once complete, the installation will feature over 5,000 ground-mounted solar panels, covering more than 30,000m² and generating 2.2MWp of renewable electricity each year – enough to meet around one third of the site's energy demand.



Roof-mounted solar panels in Aldershot (Aspire)

The project also includes a dedicated ecological enhancement scheme, with bird boxes, bat boxes and insect hotels creating habitats for bees, butterflies and other wildlife. It's a clear example of how infrastructure delivery

can support both environmental sustainability and responsible land stewardship.

While work begins at Basingbourn, Aldershot is already seeing the results of PROMETHEUS in action.

Overall, 1,670 roof-mounted solar panels have been installed across seven buildings, generating approximately 650 MWh of electricity annually.

Delivered by Aspire Defence Services Ltd in partnership with DIO under the Project Allenby/Connaught (PAC) framework, the Aldershot installation demonstrates how integrating renewable energy into existing infrastructure can deliver immediate benefits.

At Larkhill Garrison, solar capability continues to expand. Following the successful installation of more than 1,370 roof-mounted panels, the site is preparing to officially open a ground-mounted solar farm in summer 2026.

The latest installation represents a significant addition to the Army's renewable energy infrastructure, featuring 4,020 solar modules with a total capacity of 1,729 kWp. The system is projected to generate approximately 1,697 MWh annually, providing clean, sustainable energy to support the garrison's operations.

Project PROMETHEUS demonstrates how investment in renewable energy can deliver long-term value, reduce environmental impact, and ensure the Army remains ready, resilient and fit for the future.



Ground-mounted solar panels at Larkhill Garrison (Aspire)



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SAFETY VIDEO SHORTS



To access and download the above recent campaign videos, plus more in this series, go to:
<https://jive.defencegateway.mod.uk/groups/army-safety-centre>

FUTURE EVENTS

Army Safety & Environment Conference 27
 (ASEC27)

Thu 18 Mar 27, Tidworth Garrison Theatre.

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EDITORIAL

If you would like to contribute an article to Army Safety & Environment Matters magazine, please send an e-mail to:
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